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Today more than 2.2 million Americans sit in jails and prisons across 
the nation.
1
  More than 200,000 of them are under the care of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (the remainder being remanded to the custody of state 
and local authorities).
2
  As a percentage of the population, that number is 
greater than that of any other Western nation and rivals the degree to which 
citizens are imprisoned in China and Russia, authoritarian regimes to which 
Americans are not used to being compared (and whose official incarceration 
rates may understate the actual numbers).
3
 
To be sure, a significant majority of those currently in prison deserve 
to be where they are under any conception of justice.  Nobody doubts that 
murderers, rapists, and robbers are rightly subject to punishment and 
imprisonment in any society of ordered liberty.  But at some level these 
figures serve to confirm what we already instinctively know: that America 
is in the throes of a bout of overcriminalization, reflecting our instinct to 
make a case (and often a federal case) out of every transgression of societal 
norms. 
It was not always so.  The growth in criminal law today reflects a 
divergence from its treatment early in our republic and under the traditional 
common law rules of Anglo-American culture.  We have, for example, 
 
* Visiting Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, Professorial Lecturer in Law, George 
Washington University, and Principal, Red Branch Consulting PLLC.  My thanks to the 
participants in the recent conference at Northwestern, where I delivered an earlier version of 
this paper, and to the staff of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (most 
particularly Ms. Jennifer Won) for their helpful comments and editorial suggestions. 
1 LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2010 (2011). 
2 Id.  Of this 2.2 million, some 750,000 are held in local jails, many of which involve 
pretrial or juvenile detention.  Over 7 million people, or more than 3% of the U.S. 
population, are under some form of correctional supervision (including probation and 
parole). 
3 See ROY WALMSLEY, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON, WORLD POPULATION LIST 3–5 (6th ed. 
2005).  A good general source for current and historical data on incarceration in America is 
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011). 
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diluted the traditional requirement that criminal acts require criminal 
intent.
4
  We have expanded concepts of civil liability and wrongdoing into 
the criminal sphere, such that those who cause an injury that traditionally 
would require compensation are now jailed.
5
  We have seen the 
federalization of criminal laws formerly thought of as the proper domain of 
the state’s police power.6  We have diverged from the Founders’ conception 
of the separation of powers, allowing the devolution of unchecked authority 
to unelected prosecutors without the oversight of the other branches of 
government.
7
  And with the growth in mandatory and lengthy sentences, we 
have seen an explosive growth in the old-age prisoner population.
8
 
This short essay explores yet another way in which criminal justice 
today no longer resembles a justice system that the Founders would 
recognize: the atrophying of the executive’s pardon power.  For much of 
our history, the President used his pardon power to correct wrongs, forgive 
transgressors, and temper justice with mercy.
9
  Governors, likewise, used 
their power to prevent the perpetuations of injustice.
10
  Today, those 
instincts have died, buried under a legacy of prosecutorial zeal and a fear of 
adverse political criticism.
11
  And that’s a shame, for the pardon power, 
 
4 Paul Rosenzweig, The History of Criminal Law, in ONE NATION UNDER ARREST 127, 
139–43 (Paul Rosenzweig & Brian W. Walsh eds., 2010). 
5 A classic example of the criminalization of formerly civil offenses was United States v. 
Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), which imposed criminal liability on the manager of a food-
storage warehouse company for maintaining unsanitary conditions. 
6 One example of this phenomenon, subject to the limitation of the Commerce Clause 
power, was Congress’s effort to make all violence against women a federal offense.  See 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
7 BRIAN W. WALSH & BENJAMIN P. KEANE, HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMORANDUM 
NO. 64: OVERCRIMINALIZATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (Apr. 13, 2011), available at 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/lm64.pdf. 
8 Between 2007 and 2010 the number of sentenced state and federal prisoners age sixty-
five or older increased by 63%, while the overall population of sentenced prisoners grew 
only 0.7% in the same period.  There are now 26,200 prisoners age sixty-five or older.  See 
Old Behind Bars, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2012/01/27/old-behind-bars. 
9 Margaret C. Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1169, 1169 (2010) (“For most of our nation’s history, the president’s constitutional pardon 
power has been used with generosity and regularity to correct systemic injustices and to 
advance the executive’s policy goals.”). 
10 Joanna M. Huang, Correcting Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of 
Executive Clemency, 60 DUKE L.J. 131, 133 (2010) (“Executive clemency[’s] . . . flexible 
and broad nature allows the president and state governors to pardon or commute sentences at 
will, including those sentenced during the mandatory-injustice period.”). 
11 A recent example is the decision of Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour to pardon 
more than 200 individuals during his last days in office—a decision which generated a 
firestorm of criticism.  See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
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properly understood, is one of the great bulwarks of individual liberty.  It is, 
in effect, the personification of the government acting as a check on the 
institutions of the government.  Leaders today would do well to remember 
the value of the pardon power and restore it to its former prominence. 
I. PARDONS AND JUSTICE—A FOUNDER’S CONCEPTION 
I begin, appropriately enough, at the beginning—with the conception 
of the pardon power in the first days of the American republic.  To be sure, 
this inquiry may have some normative import.  For many in today’s 
academy and judiciary, the originalist interpretation of law at the time of the 
founding is an important guide to the interpretation of texts from that era.
12
  
But it is not my intention here to make that strong a claim.  Indeed, 
inasmuch as the Constitution makes only brief mention of the pardon power 
(and virtually no mention of the substantive criminal law to which the 
power is inextricably linked),
13
 a Founder’s conception of the pardon might 
appear somewhat less than controlling of its contemporary interpretation. 
Thus, I advance the far more modest claim that how the American 
legal system and its Founders treated the pardon authority is (and ought to 
be) relevant to policymakers and jurists alike who are charged with 
developing and interpreting contemporary American criminal statutes.  For 
example, if we were to conclude, at a minimum, that the founding 
generation was skeptical of the exercise of pardon authority, then we might 
approve of our current practice of limiting clemency.  Conversely, if we 
were to conclude that the exercise of the pardon authority was thought to be 
linked to the severity of the punishment to be imposed, we might develop a 
greater skepticism of, say, the movement towards felony punishment for 
simple negligence offenses. 
My conclusions from reviewing the history are relatively 
straightforward.  At the time the Constitution was framed, the pardon was 
conceived of as having a dual purpose—both as a political means of 
ameliorating dissent,
14
 broadly understood, and as a moral expression of 
 
12 See 6 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 23.5(b) (4th ed. 2008); see also Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 350–51 (1988); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is 
Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2009) (describing the originalist belief as one in which “the 
original understanding of the constitutional text always trumps any contrary understanding 
of that text in succeeding generations”) (citation omitted); Peter J. Smith, How Different Are 
Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 711 (2011). 
13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
14 See Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of Mercy: The Demise of Post-Conviction 
Relief and a Rightful Claim to Clemency, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43, 50 (1998) 
(“[T]he Framers, themselves steeped in the tradition of English law, were in substantial 
agreement about the need for an executive pardoning power and favored its adoption. . . . 
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just deserts.
15
  There was, in the Founders’ conception, a link between 
criminal liability and some form of moral blameworthiness—a link that led 
to mitigation of punishment where criminal intent was lacking.
16
 
That link between pardons and intent can be inferred from the 
contemporaneous materials from this era.  It can be seen in the writings of 
some of the Founders—Jefferson and Wilson, most clearly.  It can be 
inferred, with moderate force, from the acts of the First Congress in 
defining federal crimes and, more significantly, in providing for the 
mitigation of penalties where intent was deemed lacking.
17
 
Naturally, none of this is dispositive.  My assessment, however, is that 
the connection between crime and moral blame was far more predominant 
and influential at the founding than it is today.  It would have been unusual 
for punishment to be directed at acts where the alleged criminal acted with 
diminished intent.
18
  Today, by contrast, we are in the midst of a near orgy 
of creating crimes with either no criminal intent requirement or diminished 
intent requirements.
19
  Given the Founders’ focus on the need for 
intentionality in criminal acts, it appears that the pardon authority 
historically was much more widely and commonly deployed in earlier times 
to mitigate the punishment of those lacking criminal intent than it is today. 
The presidential power to pardon is granted under Article II, Section 2 
of the Constitution: “The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves 
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of 
 
[A]n executive pardon would allow the President to heal the country in times of civil unrest, 
thereby protecting national security.”). 
15 See Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, and 
the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 89 (2002) (“[P]ardons may be issued 
when justice would otherwise not be served either because the sentence was too harsh or 
because the person was wrongly convicted.”). 
16 See infra Part III. 
17 See infra Part III. 
18 Indeed, it was likely not until the mid-1800s (some seventy-five years after the 
American Revolution) that the first instance of a criminal prosecution without any criminal 
intent can be identified—prior to that time all common law crimes required proof of some 
form of mens rea.  See Ann Hopkins, Comment, Mens Rea and the Right to Trial by Jury, 76 
CALIF. L. REV. 391, 397 (1988).  An early example is Regina v. Stephens, [1866] 1 Q.B. 702 
(Eng.), where the bed-ridden eighty-year-old owner of a granite quarry had given 
management of the quarry to his children.  Contrary to his direct orders (and those of his 
sons), workers at the quarry deposited rubbish in the River Tivy, thereby creating a nuisance.  
The owner, Stephens, was deemed strictly liable and convicted of the criminal offense. 
19 See, e.g., BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT’L 
ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE 
CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW (Apr. 2010), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/WithoutIntent_lo-res.pdf. 
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Impeachment.”20  The text does not provide any standard for the 
presidential exercise of the power.  For all it appears, the power can be 
exercised for any reason or no reason at all.
21
  And substantively there is 
only one limitation: that impeached officeholders can’t be pardoned. 
Why such a broad and unfettered pardon power?  It was considered 
essential for both normative reasons of justice and utilitarian reasons of 
power. 
First, the pardon power coincided with the Founders’ conception of 
justice.  As Alexander Hamilton put it in Federalist No. 74: 
The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that 
without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear 
a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.  As the sense of responsibility is always 
strongest in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would 
be most ready to attend to the force of those motives, which might plead for a 
mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations, which were 
calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance.  The reflection that the fate of a 
fellow creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and 
caution: The dread of being accused of weakness or connivance, would beget equal 
circumspection, though of a different kind.
22
 
Thus, Hamilton concluded: “Humanity and good policy conspire to 
dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as 
possible fettered or embarrassed.”23 
Hamilton was not alone in his view that the pardon power’s purpose is 
to temper justice with mercy.  Chief Justice John Marshall said much the 
same thing: “A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power 
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on 
whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he 
has committed.”24 
But pardons were also seen as playing a practical role in public policy.  
Here is Hamilton on the use of pardons as a critical component of 
reconciliation: “In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often 
critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or 
 
20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl 1. 
21 Indeed, even Bill Clinton’s infamous pardon of donor Marc Rich did not violate the 
Constitution.  To be sure, it was contrary to every understanding of good governance (the 
selling of justice has been anathema at least since the Magna Carta).  See MAGNA CARTA ch. 
40 (1215) (“To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none will we delay right or 
justice”).  But no constitutional barrier to the exercise is apparent.  See Albert W. Alschuler, 
Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon Party, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1131, 1168 (2010). 
22 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
23 Id. 
24 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833). 
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rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.”25  Likewise, 
James Wilson argued during the Constitutional Convention that a “pardon 
before conviction might be necessary in order to obtain the testimony of 
accomplices.”26  For public policy reasons, as much as anything else, 
President Washington granted amnesty to those who participated in the 
Whiskey Rebellion,
27
 and Lincoln and Johnson did the same for 
Confederate soldiers who fought in the Civil War.
28
  Indeed, this aspect of 
the pardon was relatively recently used when Ford pardoned President 
Nixon and Carter granted amnesty to Vietnam-era draft evaders.
29
 
These conceptions of mercy and utility distinguished the Founders’ 
understanding of the pardon power from the pre-Revolutionary pardon 
power exercised by the king of England.  In England, the power to pardon 
was part of the king’s royal prerogative and, indeed, likely dated back to the 
time of the Norman invasion.
30
  The Parliament tried, unsuccessfully, to 
limit the king’s pardon power (which was often granted in exchange for 
money or military service).  Finally, in the Act of Settlement in 1701, the 
Parliament managed to preclude the king from pardoning officials 
 
25 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
26 Madison Debates August 27, YALE LAW SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_827.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).  The practice that has arisen 
regarding the compulsion of testimony under a grant of immunity (e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 
(2006)) makes this particular ground for the pardon power a historical curiosity. 
27 Jonathan T. Menitove, Note, The Problematic Presidential Pardon: A Proposal for 
Reforming Federal Clemency, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 452 (2009) (“[T]he President’s 
ability to pardon federal offenders swiftly has helped to heal the nation and serve the public 
interest.  George Washington used the first presidential pardon in 1795 when he granted 
amnesty to participants in the Whiskey Rebellion.”). 
28 Id. (“Perhaps the best known examples of the presidential pardon being employed to 
restore tranquility to the nation arose during and after the Civil War.  In 1863, President 
Lincoln issued a proclamation of general amnesty to those who rebelled against the Union; 
President Andrew Johnson, on Christmas Day 1868, pardoned Jefferson Davis and other 
confederate soldiers in what one scholar has called ‘the most salient exercise of executive 
clemency to date.’” (citation omitted)). 
29 Id. at 453 (“Similarly, on his first full day in office, Jimmy Carter pardoned those who 
had evaded the draft during the Vietnam War in an effort to ‘bind the wounds that an 
unpopular war had inflicted on society and on its young people, so that healing could 
begin.’” (citation omitted)). 
30 See JANICE HAMILTON, THE NORMAN CONQUEST OF ENGLAND 23 (2008) (explaining 
that prior to the Norman invasion, King Canute had the power to grant “peace” (i.e. pardon) 
to his subjects); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardon Power 
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 586 (1991). 
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impeached by Parliament,
31




For the Founders the pardon power was thus transformed into an 
authority that was both utilitarian in nature and an effort to develop a 
constitutional conception of just deserts, rather than an exercise of absolute 
authority by an unaccountable king.  As Justice Holmes put it: “A pardon in 
our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to 
possess power.  It is a part of the constitutional scheme.”33 
Indeed, as Akhil Reed Amar has noted in his history of the American 
Constitution, the federal pardon power was far broader than that possessed 
by state governors.
34
  The governor of Massachusetts, for example, could 
issue a pardon only with “the advice” of a legislatively chosen council.35  
New York’s governor could not pardon before trial and, for murder and 
treason, could only suspend a sentence pending legislative review of the 
matter.
36
  For this reason, Amar characterizes the federal pardon power as 
one of the “threads that defined America’s presidency”—threads that 
allowed for decisiveness of action and the unity of executive power.
37
 
The conception of the pardon as an exercise of justice found a ready 
echo in some of the early enactments of the new federal government.  The 
most prominent example was the Mitigation and Remittance Act of 1790.
38
  
About one year earlier, Congress had enacted a number of forfeiture 
provisions and penalties relating to the avoidance of customs duties.  For 
example, it was unlawful to unload a ship after dark (an act that might 
facilitate the evasion of tariffs) or to do so without a license (an early 
example of a malum prohibitum) crime.
39
  Other early customs penalties 
imposed fines or forfeiture for failing to get clearance to sail
40




Within a year, however, it became apparent that a number of ship 
owners had incurred liability for penalties or forfeitures principally through 
 
31 See Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.).  The Act received royal 
assent in 1701; hence it is commonly dated in that year. 
32 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl 1. 
33 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1926). 




38 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 122. 
39 Act of Jul. 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29. 
40 Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55. 
41 Act of Sept. 1, 1789, 1 Stat. at 63. 
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ignorance of the recently enacted customs regulations, tariffs, and duties.
42
  
The First Congress provided a means of mitigating the punishments (in 
effect, a statutory pardon) with district judges finding the facts of the matter 
and reporting on them to the Secretary of the Treasury.  The Secretary, in 
turn, had the “power to mitigate or remit” any penalty “if in his opinion the 
same was incurred without wilful negligence or any intention or fraud.”43  
In other words, Congress recognized that it had created criminal liability 
where intent might be lacking and provided a mechanism for the mitigation 
of punishment for those deemed to lack criminal intent.
44
 
The sentiment behind mitigating penalties when criminal intent was 
lacking was no stray or isolated thought.  Indeed, it survived even in times 
of conflict on the brink of war.  In 1800, when Congress passed a law 
suspending commerce with France, it imposed a series of penalties and 
forfeitures to enforce the adopted restrictions.
45
  Yet even here, in the midst 
of heightened tensions, Congress also saw fit to extend the provisions of the 
Mitigation and Remittance Act and apply them to “all penalties and 
forfeitures incurred by force of this act.”46 
The same was true nine years later, in 1809, when Congress imposed 
an embargo on trade with Great Britain in the run-up to the War of 1812.
47
  
Though the embargo was a critical component of American opposition to 
British actions on the high seas, the mitigation and remittance provisions 
were again adopted to excuse those who acted without willful negligence or 
the intent to defraud.
48
 
There is also modest evidence of this ameliorating conception of the 
pardon power in some of the writings of the early Founders—writings that 
might be thought by some to bear less weight than congressional 
 
42 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS 50–51 (1997). 
43 Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122, 122–23.  Although initially passed as a temporary 
measure, the provision suspending operation of the Act was repealed in 1800, making the 
underlying provision a permanent part of the law.  Act of Feb. 17, 1800, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 7. 
44 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the 
Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 213 (1995); see 
also David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First 
Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 827 (1994) (“Congress perceived no 
constitutional impediment to this convenient use of judicial officers for purely administrative 
purposes.” (citation omitted)). 
45 Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7. 
46 Id. § 9. 
47 Act of Jan. 9, 1809, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 506. 
48 Id. § 12. 
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enactments or expositions in the Federalist Papers, but which are, 
nevertheless, indicative of the tenor of the times, so to speak.
49
 
Jefferson, for example, often wrote of punishment for criminal law 
violations as grounded in concepts of morality and just desert.  Punishment, 
he said, must be “proportioned to the injury”50 caused and the scale of the 
punishment must reflect the “atrocity of the crime.”51  Like most who 
viewed just deserts as the grounds for criminal punishment, Jefferson often 
focused on the intent of the offender as the basis for culpability.  As he 
wrote to his relative Philip Turpin, “it is the intention alone which 
constitutes the criminality of any act.”52  Though not speaking directly of 
the pardon power, the underlying penological theory grounding Jefferson’s 
thinking linked punishment to justice and intent and would have been a 
background for the foundations of justice and mercy reflected in the pardon 
authority.  And when Jefferson later became President, his actions reflected 
that understanding.  He pardoned some dissenters who had been convicted 
under the Sedition Act, deeming that act “a nullity, as absolute and palpable 
as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image.”53 
James Wilson
54
 took an even more definite view of the foundation of 
law.  He was, by all accounts, convinced that criminal law in particular 
flowed from a natural law.
55
  His understanding of that foundation 
translated, again, into a strong view of just deserts.  His view was that only 
conduct that actually was unjust was properly called a crime.  “Every crime 
includes an injury: every offence is also a private wrong: it affects the 
publick, but it affects the individual likewise.”56  And, like Jefferson, 
Wilson believed strongly that punishment must be proportional to the crime 
 
49 I am indebted for much of the brief discussion that follows in the text to the far more 
detailed insights in RONALD PESTRITTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW 122–38 (2000). 
50 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, in Cases 
Heretofore Capital, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 218, 219 (Andrew A. 
Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905). 
51 Thomas Jefferson, Answers to Questions Addressed to Him by Monsieur de Meusnier, 
in 17 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 50, at 49, 79. 
52 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Turpin (July 29, 1783), in 6 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 324, 326 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952). 
53 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in 4 MEMOIR, 
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES: FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 22, 23 
(Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829). 
54 For more on this constitutional framer, law professor, and Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court, see Andrew C. Laviano, James Wilson, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 
1789–1995, at 16, 17–18 (Claire Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
55 See, e.g., James Wilson, Lectures on Law of the Law of Nature, in 1 WORKS OF THE 
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 107, 131–33 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804). 
56 James Wilson, Lectures on Law of the Nature of Crimes, in 3 WORKS OF THE 
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, supra note 55, at 3, 6. 
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committed.
57
  Here too, though he said little about the link of just 
punishment to the pardon power, his underlying penological theory 
supported that authority. 
To be sure, neither Jefferson nor Wilson spoke directly to the pardon 
power.  They both might as readily be read to say that intentionality (and 
thus the justness of punishment) was for a jury or a judge to determine and 
nothing more.  According to this reading, their penological theories speak 
only to the degree of punishment, not to the identity of the actor with whom 
the obligation to judge the justness of the punishment rests.  But that, I 
submit, narrows the nature of their theory of just deserts.  It seems more 
likely that they would have seen the substantive result of just punishment as 
more important and significant than the identity of the actor who assured 
that justice had been done. 
Finally, we can see a broad acceptance of the pardon power in the 
early practice of the republic.  Although Washington and Adams made little 
use of the pardon power (16 and 21 pardon statements, respectively), other 
early presidents were far more generous with their mercy.
58
  Jefferson 
signed at least 119 pardon statements; Madison, 196 (or possibly 202—the 
records are unclear); Monroe, 419; and John Quincy Adams, 183.
59
  Plainly, 
the pardon was a regular aspect of the criminal justice system early in 
American history. 
II. THE ATROPHY OF THE PARDON 
Today, the pardon power is little used.  While the Constitution places 
no significant limitations on the ability of a president to grant pardons, 
presidents have issued fewer and fewer of them over the years.  Abraham 
 
57 Id. at 44 (“As the punishment ought to be confined to the criminal; so it ought to bear a 
proportion, it ought, if possible, to bear even an analogy, to the crime.”). 
58 P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Policy as an Indicator of “Original Understanding”: Executive 
Clemency in the Early Republic (1789–1817), at 6–7 (Nov. 1994) (paper presented to 
Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association), available at 
http://www.rvc.cc.il.us/faclink/pruckman/pardoncharts/Paper7.pdf.  
59 Actual pardon numbers are difficult to state with certainty, both because of the age of 
the records and because early presidents frequently made pardon or clemency grants to a 
number of people in a single instrument.  In general, the actual number of people receiving 
pardons is greater than the number of pardon signing statements—for example, Madison’s 
approximately 200 pardon statements granted relief to more than 250 individuals.  The data 
offered in text is taken from id. at 7; P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Federal Executive Clemency in 
United States, 1789-1995: A Preliminary Report 16 tbl.2 (Nov. 1995) (paper presented to 
Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association) (on file with the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology). 
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Lincoln granted more than 200 pardons in his first two years in office.
60
  He 
once granted clemency to sixty-two deserters in a single day.
61
 
The commonplace of 150 years ago is the exception today.  The 
Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney’s statistics on the 
issuance of pardons reflects this decline over time.
62
  At the start of the 
twentieth century, presidents routinely granted between 100 and 200 
pardons every year.
63
  As recently as 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt 
granted 204 pardons in his first year in office.  By contrast, President 
George W. Bush granted only 200 pardons or commutations during his 
entire eight-year term.  And in his nearly four years in office, President 




This is all the more stunning a figure when one considers the radical 
growth we have seen in federal prosecutions.  President Obama’s twenty-
two pardons are but a miniscule fraction of the 200,000 federal prisoners 
today.  Indeed, strictly speaking, since all of President Obama’s pardons 
have been granted to those who had already served their terms of 
imprisonment, not a single individual has been released from prison by 
virtue of a presidential pardon during the Obama Administration.  By 
contrast, in the early 1900s, when fewer than 10,000 federal prisoners were 
incarcerated nationwide,
65
 pardons averaged roughly 300 each year.
66
  Both 
in absolute terms and, far more notably, as a percentage, the rate of pardons 
has decreased significantly. 
Many have speculated as to reasons for the decline.  One reason may 
be theoretical (or perhaps one should say, “ideological”).  Some have 
argued that pardon powers are inconsistent with a solid theory of criminal 
law.
67
  They are, after all, an inherently idiosyncratic and sometimes even 
 
60 Love, supra note 9, at 1170 (citing P.S. Ruckman, Jr. & David Kincaid, Inside 
Lincoln’s Clemency Decision Making, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 84 (1999)). 
61 Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 60, at 85. 
62 All data in the text was taken from the Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. DEP’T OF 




65 For example, in 1925 only 6,430 prisoners were incarcerated in federal prisons.  See 
PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN 
STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925–86, Table 1. 
66 Love, supra note 9, at 1188. 
67 For example, Cesare Beccaria contended that pardons were capricious and irregular 
and thus inconsistent with a good theory of criminal justice.  See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, 
PARDONS 39 (1989) (citing C. B. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 158–59 
(photo. reprint 1953) (2d ed. 1819)). 
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arbitrary exercise of presidential authority—one person making a decision 
without standards or formal guidance.  Thus, some see pardons as a 
“lawless” exercise that threatens the rule of law.68  For the same reason, 
many utilitarian thinkers might oppose pardons as making suboptimal 
allocations of punishment. 
Other related reasons also offer some explanation for the decline of the 
pardon.  Improved pretrial and trial procedures,
69
 improvements in forensic 
science (e.g., DNA testing),
70
 and a greater opportunity for review on direct 
appeal and by habeas corpus may have reduced materially the number of 
erroneous convictions that otherwise would have led to clemency.  
Likewise, limits on sentencing discretion
71
 may well have reduced the 
number of unduly lengthy sentences (though the development of many stiff 




68 E.g., AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL 69 (2005). 
69 By this I mean the familiar improvements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 463 (1966), and the like. 
70 Projects like the Innocence Project have generally been successful in securing relief 
through collateral review in the courts.  See Know the Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).  Were that not the case, 
DNA testing might call for greater rather than less pardon authority. 
71 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3625, 3673, 3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2006)) (creating 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission and abolishing parole to promote “honest” length sentences 
and to avoid “unwarranted sentencing disparities . . . .”).  The Court in United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., writing for the Court in part), invalidated the 
mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines as violating the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
of a jury trial and made the Guidelines advisory.  However, this advisory nature of the 
Guidelines does not eliminate their influence.  At least one study found that in the year after 
Booker most district courts continued to sentence within the Guideline’s sentencing range.  
Frank O. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee . . . or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary 
Observations about the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System after Booker, 43 HOUS. 
L. REV. 279, 300 (2006). 
72 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2006) (imposing a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment on a defendant convicted of a violent felony if he has two or more prior 
convictions of violent felonies or a conviction for a violent felony and a drug conviction in 
either state or federal court); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (West 2010) (imposing a maximum 
term of life imprisonment and a minimum term of the greater of three times the underlying 
offense or twenty-five years for those with two or more prior felony convictions); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West 2004 & 2011 Supp.) (allowing the state to seek to classify 
defendants with two or more prior felony convictions as habitual offenders, which requires 
the court to sentence the defendants to an additional fixed term of at least the length of the 
underlying offense but no longer than three times that length or thirty years); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 15:529 (2005 & 2012 Supp.) (increasing imprisonment lengths for each subsequent 
felony conviction to not less than the longest possible penalty for a first offense after the 
fourth felony conviction); see also Michael Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case: 
The Supreme Court Restores Democracy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1625 n.142 (1997) 
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This perception might also be linked to an increase in the 
professionalization of law enforcement (both investigators and trial 
attorneys in the federal system), which also would have reduced the number 
of erroneous convictions. 
To be sure, this conclusion is not ineluctable.  One need only think, for 
example, of the controversy regarding prosecutorial misconduct in the trial 
of former Senator Ted Stevens to realize that our comfort with the inerrancy 
of the criminal trial system is, perforce, far from absolute.
73
  On the other 
hand, it may be fair to say that justice today is meted out through a more 
regularized and professional process than it was a century ago.  And if we 
accept (as seems plausible) that to some degree trial proceedings are now 
fairer and more accurate than they were 100 years ago, a concomitant 
decline in the use of pardons to correct injustice is to be expected.
74
 
Another theory is that the recent decline in the use of the pardon is a 
direct result of the actions of President Clinton during his last days in 
office.  The flood of pardons issued by President Clinton was unseemly, at 
best.
75
  There are at least some grounds for thinking that his discretionary 
exercise of authority has poisoned the well of pardon mercy—particularly 
for Democratic presidents who are seeking to avoid a “soft on crime” label.  
While certainly a partial explanation, it is incomplete.  The decline in 
pardon authority long predated the Clinton presidency (and followed it as 
well, as the minimal use of the pardon by President Bush attests) and 
Clinton’s ill-considered use of the pardon cannot explain that earlier 
decline. 
A final (and to my mind more plausible) theory is that the atrophy of 
the pardon power arises from its institutionalization.  Before the Office of 
the Pardon Attorney was established, presidents considered pardons 
individually, often on their own time.  Now, the pardon attorney is resident 
 
(reporting that in the first two years of California’s three strikes law, the majority of its 
applications were for nonviolent drug offenses). 
73 See, e.g., In re Contempt Finding in U.S. v. Stevens, 744 F. Supp. 2d 253, 255 (D. 
D.C. 2010) aff’d, 663 F.3d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (denying motion to vacate February 13, 
2009, contempt finding against three Department of Justice officials but dismissing contempt 
charges as documents were produced); see also Nedra Pickler, Justice Dept. Lawyers in 
Contempt for Withholding Stevens Documents, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2009, at A7. 
74 One related trial change has clearly reduced the need for pardons.  As noted earlier, the 
development and use of immunity statutes, and their blessing by the Supreme Court in 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 451–53 (1972), has eliminated the need for a 
president to grant an individual a pardon in order to enable the prosecution to use that person 
as a trial witness.  On the other hand, this change is something of a one-way ratchet—the 
United States rarely (if ever) grants immunity to defense witnesses so that a defendant may 
secure their testimony, effectively limiting the availability of some exculpatory information. 
75 See Alschuler, supra note 21, at 1136–37 (one observer likened the atmosphere to a 
“Middle Eastern bazaar”). 
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in the Department of Justice and assists the President in reviewing requests 
for pardons according to settled guidelines.
76
  These recommendations from 
the pardon attorney are just that—recommendations and nothing more.  The 
President is not required to follow them and retains full pardon authority.  
And yet, it would be a bold—or foolhardy—president who overrode the 
recommendations of his pardon attorney.
77
 
More importantly, the advent of a pardon attorney has institutionalized 
the hostility of prosecutors to the exercise of the pardon power.  When the 
President exercised the pardon power directly or, more recently, when he 
reviewed recommendations made by the Attorney General, pardon 
applications were examined with two views in mind.  To be sure, they 
brought the perspective of law enforcement officers sworn to uphold the 
law and take care that federal criminal statutes are faithfully executed.  But, 
as political actors, the President and the Attorney General also brought to 
the review a more finely tuned sense of political judgment and a generalized 
appreciation for the American body politic and its sensitivity to criminal 
law. 
That has changed.  In the late 1970s, Attorney General Griffin Bell 
delegated the recommendation role to the same officials who made 
prosecution policy.
78
  This has had the natural tendency of modifying the 
DOJ approach to pardon applications—they are now seen as a challenge to 
an administration’s law enforcement policy rather than as an effort to 
individualize justice.  The trend only accelerated under President Reagan 
when a tighter control of pardon authority was instituted in order to ensure 
that the policy “better reflect[ed] his administration’s philosophy toward 
crime.”79  This isn’t “wrong” as a matter of philosophy, but it is fair to say 
that using career prosecutors to screen pardon applications
80
 has the natural 
tendency of subjecting pardon applications to greater scrutiny with less 
lenity.  This is to be expected, because career prosecutors (like any human 
beings) are products of their culture and less likely to see flaws in the 
actions of their colleagues. 
 
76 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1.10 (2011). 
77 Take President Clinton, for example.  See Alschuler, supra note 21, at 1136–60 
(detailing numerous questionable, end-of-term pardons issued by President Clinton). 
78 See Love, supra note 9, at 1197. 
79 Pete Earley, Presidents Set Own Rules on Granting Clemency, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 
1984, at A17 (quoting David C. Stephenson, Acting U.S. Pardon Attorney). 
80 All but a handful of the individuals officially responsible for approving Justice 
Department clemency recommendations since 1983 have been former federal prosecutors.  
See Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Practice of 
Pardoning, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 125, 132 n.23 (2001). 
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The incentive structures surrounding the creation of criminal laws 
exacerbate this tendency.  For too long, we have failed to examine the 
causes of criminalization, and as a result we have allowed ourselves to 
criminalize conduct that ought not, in any just world, be criminal.  This 
trend in criminalization is part of a broader social trend to use more severe 
punishments as a means of deterring crime and of deterring other social 
behavior—with the natural result that we tend to dismiss more readily the 
necessity for pardons and mercy. 
The expansion of criminal law is the product of institutional pressures 
that have more to do with politics than social necessity.
81
  Few, if any, 
groups regularly lobby legislators regarding criminal law.  Those groups 
that do are more likely to seek harsher penalties and more criminal laws, 
rather than more lenient penalties and fewer laws.  As a consequence, 
political considerations give the legislator every incentive to be 
overinclusive in crafting criminal laws rather than underinclusive.
82
  The 
same political impulse tends to limit the willingness to use the powers of 
clemency. 
Indeed, if any proof that the political winds disfavored mercy is 
necessary, the recent experiences of former Mississippi Governor Haley 
Barbour serve to demonstrate the point.
83
  Barbour, widely regarded as a 
conservative executive, granted more than 200 pardons as his term as 
Governor neared its conclusion.  More than twenty-five of them were to 
individuals still serving terms of imprisonment and a few were even for 
individuals convicted of violent murders.  Though sometimes couched as a 
legal dispute,
84
 the hailstorm of criticism that rained down on Governor 
Barbour had, one suspects, far more to do with a generalized objection to 
the use of a pardon authority to show mercy than it did to any real concern 
about the legal niceties of the mechanism by which the pardons were 
 
81 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
510 (2001). 
82 PAUL J. LARKIN, JR., HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 75: 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LEGISLATIVE SIDE OF THE PROBLEM 1 (Dec. 13, 2011), available 
at  http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/lm75.pdf. 
83 There are hundreds of reports of the controversy generated by the Governor’s pardons.  
E.g., Richard Fausset, Pardons Could Haunt Barbour, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2012, at A1. 
84 See Miss. High Court Steps into Flap Over Pardons, USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2012, at A3.  
The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the state attorney general’s request to void pardons 
granted by the governor despite the applicants’ alleged failure to publish notice of their 
requests in the manner required by the state constitution.  See In re Hooker, 87 So.3d 401, 
407 (Miss. 2012). 
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granted.  Governor Barbour has defended his actions, but at some 
significant cost to his political reputation.
85
 
In addition, the trend toward criminalization is aided by legislative 
reliance on the existence of prosecutorial discretion.  As the late Professor 
William Stuntz of Harvard has noted, American criminal law “covers far 
more conduct than any jurisdiction could possibly punish.”86  This broad 
span of American law is the product of institutional pressures that attract 
legislators to laws with broader liability rules and harsher sentences.
87
  
When a legislator is faced with a choice between drafting a new criminal 
statute narrowly and potentially underinclusive or broadly and potentially 
overinclusive, political considerations give the legislator an incentive to be 
overinclusive.  The political dynamic is exacerbated by the consideration, 
usually implicit, of the costs associated with the criminal justice system.  
Broad and overlapping statutes with minimum obstacles to criminalization 
and harsh penalties are easier to administer and reduce the costs of the legal 
system to the government.  They induce guilty pleas and produce high 
conviction rates, minimizing the costs of the cumbersome jury system and 
producing outcomes popular with the public.
88
 
The final piece of the equation is legislative reliance on the existence 
of prosecutorial discretion as a means of avoiding responsibility for the 
consequences of their decisions.  When a broad and harsh statute produces 
an unpopular outcome that the public dislikes, blame will lie with 
prosecutors for exercising their discretion poorly and never with the 
legislators who adopted the overbroad statute in the first instance.
89
  But the 
natural consequence is that prosecutors, relishing their discretion, are poorly 
positioned to second-guess their own exercise of that power though the 
mechanism of clemency—if you give the prosecutor broad authority to 
make decisions, you cannot be surprised when he is impressed with his own 
rectitude and judgment. 
 
85 Not everyone was opposed to the pardons.  For one of the few editorials in support of 
Governor Barbour, see A Quality of Mercy in Haley Barbour’s Pardons, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Jan. 24. 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-
view/2012/0124/A-quality-of-mercy-in-Haley-Barbour-s-pardons. 
86 Stuntz, supra note 81, at 507. 
87 See id. at 510 (explaining that the political atmosphere created by “[t]he current tough-
on-crime phase of our national politics” is responsible for the present trend toward broader 
liability and harsher sentences). 
88 See id. at 536–39 (demonstrating that costs related to the criminal justice system can 
be reduced by limiting the number of cases filed, restricting the amount of time spent per 
case and by encouraging plea-bargaining in lieu of a criminal trial). 
89 See id. at 548 (noting that Kenneth Starr’s investigation of President Clinton created 
hostility to Starr and not to Congress, which wrote the federal perjury and obstruction of 
justice statutes). 
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III. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH 
How then to navigate the Scylla and Charybdis of pardons—allowing 
the invocation of mercy and the amelioration of an excessive criminal code 
while avoiding the specter of lawless, unprincipled, and, in some cases, 
overly politicized exercises of the pardon power? 
In an ideal world, the need for clemency would exist at the margins of 
the law, to take care of extraordinary cases.  This would be the result of a 
well-developed, well-regulated, and moderate criminal law.  As the 
philosopher Cesare Beccaria put it while opposing the power of a pardon as 
a lawless exercise: “Clemency is . . . a virtue which ought to shine in the 
code, and not in private judgment.” 90 
Sadly, our current system does not see the judicious application of 
punishment as a virtue.  Rather, it has become a system where criminal 
intent is no longer required to be a criminal and where traditional concepts 
of responsibility for the acts of another have become subsumed within 
amorphous doctrines with names like “responsible corporate officer.”91  In 
short, within the confines of our prosecutorial structures there is no virtue of 
clemency. 
Reinvigorating that spirit is urgently required both as a practical matter 
and as a matter of fidelity to the original Founders’ understanding of the 
proper scope of criminal law.  But we cannot get there with the current 
architecture of pardon review.  It simply is asking too much for DOJ 
prosecutors to review their own work. 
On the other hand, no matter how much an originalist might wish for a 
return to limited government, it is also asking too much for us to expect a 
president to find time to personally conduct an independent inquiry and 
consider every application for a pardon or the commutation of a sentence.  
That just isn’t feasible at this juncture. 
What is needed is an institutional solution that honors the Founders’ 
expectations of personal justice and political reality.  The institution should, 
therefore, reflect the sentiments of its presidential sponsor while affording 
the President a realistic and unbiased opportunity to review cases and make 
an informed decision.  The current institutional solution—locating the 
 
90 BECCARIA, supra note 67, at 158. 
91 The responsible corporate officer doctrine, first developed in United States v. 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) and United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), stands 
broadly for the proposition that a corporate officer can be convicted of a crime even though 
he took no direct part in its commission if he stands in some “responsible relationship” to the 
criminal actions (as, for example, if he has a duty and capability of preventing their 
occurrence).  See Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal 
Sanction: Standards of Liability, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1263–64 (1979). 
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pardon attorney under the deputy attorney general in the Department of 
Justice and staffing it with a career prosecutor—does not meet this need. 
The pardon authority is an unfettered executive power.  The President 
needs no statutory authority to change how he administers pardons and 
reviews clemency applications.  He is free to change the current rules as and 
when he sees fit.  If this Administration (or any administration for that 
matter) wanted to reinvigorate the pardon power and return it to its original 
function, it would: 
 Recreate a pardon-reviewing authority either outside of the 
Department of Justice, as part of the Executive Office of the 
President, or as a direct function of the Attorney General as the 
President’s personal representative; and 
 Staff the new Pardon Office with a range of staff, including 
prosecutors, sociologists, psychologists, historians, and even 
defense attorneys. 
Doing either, or both, of these things would alleviate most of the 
systemic problems that plague the current way in which the pardon process 
is implemented.  Moving the office outside of the Department of Justice 
would restore the pardon function to its traditional status as an exercise of 
pure presidential authority.  Including staff who are not exclusively career 
prosecutors would bring a more balanced perspective to the decisionmaking 
and would eliminate the natural and understandable institutional tendency 
of prosecutors to be confident in the rectitude of their own judgment.
92
 
The location of the reinvigorated office is, naturally, capable of some 
debate.  Placing it in the Executive Office of the President would return the 
pardon to its original status as a matter of the personal judgment of the 
President.  It would also greatly diminish concerns that agents and 
prosecutors are strongly motivated to defend their investigative and 
charging decisions.  But placing the Pardon Attorney in the White House 
may be seen as further politicizing the process, rather than dealing with 
those concerns.  The alternative, which might be a “best of both worlds” 
compromise, would staff the Pardon Office with professionals from various 
fields but place the Pardon Office as part of the Attorney General’s office, 
with the Pardon Attorney reporting directly to the Attorney General without 
going through the deputy attorney general.  An alternative might be to have 
 
92 One particularly good candidate for the systematic application of a revived pardon 
power would be the increasingly older prisoners.  Studies in Florida, Colorado, and New 
York suggest that older prisoners are less likely to be recidivists when released than are 
equivalent younger prisoners.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8.  Perhaps of equal 
significance, medical expenditures for aged prisoners are three to nine times greater than for 
younger ones, id., making release a possible win–win social proposition. 
2012] REFLECTIONS ON THE ATROPHYING PARDON POWER 611 
the Pardon Office be a separate independent agency (much like the 
Sentencing Commission). 
If the President were to delegate the initial review of clemency 
applications to this new Pardon Office we might, just might, see a positive 
result—the amelioration of harsh justice in America today and the 
restoration of a traditional conception of presidential power. 
612 PAUL ROSENZWEIG [Vol. 102 
 
